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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CACHE VALLEY BANKING COMpANY, a Utah corporation, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of WILFORD F. BATTGH,
Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
C A C H E C 0 U N T Y POULTRY
GROWER'S ASSOCIATION, a
corporation, and UTAH POULTRY
& FARMERS COOPERATIVE, ·a
corporation,
Defendants and Resp·on,dents.

Case No.
7304
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APPEAL FROM THE DisTRICT CouRT oF THE FmsT JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C~-\CHE

\T_A.LijEY B ...-\Xl'-ING COnJp ...:-\.XY, a T'tah eorporation, a~ Executor of the Last \·rill and TestaInent of \·rrr~FORD F. BAlTGH,
Deceased,
Plain.tifl and _.:l]Jpellanf,

Case No.
7~04

YS.

C ...-\ C H E C 0 lT N T Y POULTRY
GROWER'S ASSOCIATION, a
corporation, and UTAH POULTRY
& F ...-\R~IER~ COOPERATIVE, a
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In general, respondent agrees with appellant's statement of facts but disputes some of the assertions. It is
felt that the follo,ving facts are supported by the evidence:
On page 4 of appellant's brief it is stated: "There
. were no marks on the premises to indicate a traveled
r 0 a d ... "
It was hard surfaced (Tr. 142, 148). It had the

appearance of a road (Tr. 134 bottom, 147 bottom) and
showed signs of wear where vehicles passed down the
roadway (Tr. 141 hottom, 192 bottom, 193, 194). Noth-
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ing grew in the roadway (Tr. 134 middle). It was
described as a ''very good road'' ( Tr. 147 bottom). Its
width was sufficient for two trucks· to pass (Tr. 158
bottom, 159). Trucks have a maximum width of 8 feet
(Tr. 159). The roadway passed between the scalehouse
on the north and the railroad spur track on the south
( Tr. 159 top) and the scalehouse was measured to be 17
feet north of the north side of respondent's property.
The south edge of the disputed right of ~ay was just
north of the respondent's north line (Tr. 194 middle, 200
middle, 201). So much for the question of the evidence
of a road.
As to the amount of traffic on the disputed right of
way, in and out of the Cache Valley Commission Company's property, the undisputed testimony was that it
"was in constant use'' (Tr. 107 middle); "It was in
heavy use" (Tr. 111 bottom); "It was used every day"
(Tr. 112). It appeared " ... almost like the traffic on
l\1:ain Street" (Tr. 112 top). " ... practically everyone
. . . who patronized the Cache Commission Co., and
that was nearly everybody" used the disputed right of
way (Tr. 148 middle). "I would say fifty to a hundred
people'' and vehicles used the disputed right of way
every day (Tr. 149 middle). See also more testimony to
the same effect in the Transcript, page 155 (middle),
page 169 (top), page 171 (middle), page 175 (bottom),
and page 185 (bottom). Carloads of produce were
shipped out (Tr. 215, 219, 220). Carloads of supplies
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brought in and the outgoing produce \Ya~ brought into
the \Yarehouse, and the incoming supplie~ \Yere sold to
customers \Yho can1e and '"~nt over the rlispnted right
of \Yay.
One more faet \Yhirh enters into the consideration
here is that the Utah Idaho c~ntral Railroad, whose
Logan freight yard \Yas finally sold to the plaintiff's
testate on Rec.eiYer 's sale (page 014-016, all references
to page numbers in this paragraph are to the abstract
of title, Exhibit E)' and over the south rod of vvhich the
disputed right of "~ay ran, was a weak, sick railroad from
its inception. It was first mortgaged in 1915 (page 004),
and again in 1920, (page 006) and sold by Receiver's
Deed in 1926 (page 007). It was mortgaged again in
1926 (page 010) and sold again by a receiver in 1939
(page 011). It was mortgaged still again in 1939, this
time with both a first and a second mortgage· (pages 012,
013). The railroad was finally abandoned and its pro-

perty sold in small parcels by a receiver in the United
Rtates District Court in 1947 (pages 014 and 018).
It is said at the bottom of page 5 of the brief that
customers had access to Second South at any time. That
alley was not opened to traffic at first (Tr. 218); later
it was, but was not used very much.
While Mr. Bowen said he didn't intend to acquire
a prescriptive easement ( Tr. 221), no evidence was. introduced of the Cache Valley Commission Comp·any's
intention in that regard. This company was a corpora-
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tion (Tr. 212 middle). G. B. Bowen was its manager
(Tr. 212).
It is stated on page 12 of the brief that there is no
evidence that the disputed right of way was used for
foot or animal traffic. It was testified that the employees
of the respondent's predecessor used the disputed right
of way for ingress and egress ( Tr. 186 middle). No presumption is known that such employees would be riding
rather than walking. And it was used by vehicles (Tr.
110 middle, 186 middle) and by teams (Tr. 110 middle).
It was stipulated that not only the seven witnesses
who testified as to the use of the disputed right of way
C on Exhibit 3, by the large number of customers of
the Cache Valley Commission (predecessor in interest
of the respondent) in going to and from that company's
place of business, the condition of the· roadway and the
position of it, but that nine other witnesses would testify
to the same things the seven had sworn to (Tr. 190, 191,
192).
ARGUMENT
Appellant bank's first point relates to the shifting
of the burden of proof and in support of the claim that
the burden did not shift from respondent to appellant,
states that there is no evidence that the use of the disputed right of way was adverse or under claim of right
or that ap-pellant knew of such facts. (Both the appellant and the respondent are successors in interest to the
parties who were the owners at the time the acts referred
4
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to~ \Yere

done. \\~hil~ thP rP fprenep to n ppP llan t o 1't Pll
tilnes actually is to appellant~s prerlPce~~or, that fnet
is ignored \\~here not iinportant to thP i~snes of t hP en~P.)
X(YI'()RIOlTS "(TSI~: OF, RIG ll T OF \\' r\-Y
Let ns disen~~ the last point first that there i~ no

.

pvidence that the appellant kne'v of the n~e of thiR di~puted right of \Yay in obtaining

the Cache ,..,.alley Conunission

ingres~

propert~T·

and egress to
It see1ns in-

credible that the railroad could not haYe known of its
n;e hy the Cache , . . alle~T Con1mission e1nployees and
rnsto1ners.

~-\_s

noted in the Facts at the beginning of this

brief, that traffic to and from the Con1mission 's property
over the disputed right of

"\Va~~

'vas such that the road

'vas in "constant use" (Tr. 107), "heavy use ... every

day" (Tr. 111). "It appeared ... almost like the traffic

on Main Street'' ( Tr. 112).
''Actual notice to the owner of the servient
estate is not necessary if the user is so notorious
that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
o"\vner should learn thereof; then he will have
constructive notice of the user which is sufficient.
Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah 74, 287 P. 622; Bolton v.
Murphy, 41 Utah 591, 127 P. 355; Crosier v.
Brown, 66 \V. Va. 273, 66 S. E. 326, 25. L. R. A.
(N. S.) 174; Gardner v. Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40
S. E. 271; Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash.
202, 116 P. 843, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941; Wats~on
v. Board of County C~ommissioners, 38 Wash. 662,
80 P. 201 ; 2 Tiffany on Real Property ( 2d Ed.),
521.''
.Trnsen v. Gerrard, R5 Utah 481, 39 P(2) 1070, 2. It
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would appear from the heavy, constant use that the
doctrine of the Jensen case applies here. It can't be
claimed that appellant did not know of our use of the
disputed right of way.
This brings us to the main point in this case, namely: .

OPEN USER FOR ·THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
RAISES A PRESUMPTION OF ADVERSE CLAIM.
This court, in the case of Zollinger v. Frank, 110
Utah 514, 175 P.(2) 714, quoted with approval the following from 17 Am. Jur. 981, Sec. 72:
''The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has shown an open, visible, continuous, and
unmolested use of land for the period of time
sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse user,
the use will be presumed to be under a claim of
right. The owner of the servient estate, in order
to avoid the acquisition of an ·easement by prescription, has the burden of rebutting this presumption by showing that the use was permissive."
In 1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) 718,
Sec. 436, the matter is treated thus:
''The uninterrupted, continued and unexplained, or undisputed use uf an alleged e'asement
for the established period of prescription raises
a 'presumption that the use was under elaim of
right ·of grant, and the burden is then .on the
.o,vner of the servient e.sta te to show that .the use
has been permissive ·or by virtue of a license.''
And the same author, in 2· Thompson R:eal Property
(.Perm. Ed.) 114. Sec. 525, further dis-cusses the matt~r
in this way:
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~·In an aetiun to f\~tablish a right of \Yay· h~·
prP~eription, the que~tion i8 for thP jury \VhPthPr

the u~e '"a~ under a rlain1 of right, or \VHH nlPl'Pl~·
a n1atter of neighborly neeonunodation. The burden of proof is on the lando\vnPr to 8hO\\' that the
n~~ of a "~ay oYer hi8 land, for the prP8rriptiYP
period, '"a~ b~y licPnse and not adYP1'8P. If one
n~e~ ·a road oYer the land of another, \vithout
asking leave and 'vithout objection, a grant is
presumed: hut this prf\sumption may be rebutted
in sub~erYienre to the title of the O\Yner. 'In the
absence of evidence tending t·o sho\v that such
long <¥lntinued use of the vvay may he referred to
a license~ or special indulgence, that is either revocable or tern1inable, the conclusion is that it
ha~ gro\vn ·Out of a grant by the owner of the land
and ha~ been exrcised under a title thus derived.' ''
In 28 C.J.~. 736, the ~uhject is treated thus:
''While the contrary is true in some jurisdictions, sometimes by reason of statute, the general
rule is that proof of an open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted user for the p-rescriptive
period, without evidence to explain how it began,
raises a presumption that it was ·adverse and under a claim of right, or, as is sometimes stated,
raises a presumpti·on of a grant, and casts on the
owner of the servient tenement the burden ·of
showing that the user was permissive or by virtue of some license, indulgence, ·or agreement, inconsistent with the right cl·aimed."
This prevailing rule is the law in the State of Utah
and is con trolling in this case. This court, in Zollinger
Y. Frank, 110 Utah ;)14, 175 P.(2) 714, after quoting the
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American Juris prudence statement set forth above, said:
''We think the better rule is that described
as the prevailing rule in the above quotation.
That is, where a claimant has shown an open and
eontinuous use of the land for the prescriptive
period ( 20 years in Utah) the use will be presumed to have been against the owner and the
owner of the servient estate to prevent the ~re
scriptive easement from arising has the burden
of showing that the use was under him instead
of against him. This rule was mentioned in the
recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.
v. Moyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (j>n rehearing)
174 P. 2d 148, 155, where it was s1aid: 'It is true
that t·o establish an easement the use must be
notorious and continuous and on this adverseness
-that is, holding against the ·owner-will be presumed.' See also Northwest Cities Gas Co. v.
Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771;
Eagle Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co.,
59 Idaho 413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. Howard,
150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908 ; Stetson v. Youngquist,
76 M·ont. 600, 248 P. 196.
''In this case Zollinger shows and the court
found an open and continuous use for the prescriptive period. The presumption that the use
was against the landowner therefore arises.''
On page 14 of its Brief, the bank seeks to escape
the effect of the Zollinger case by reference to Harkness
v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291. In that case,
the decision was directed to the question of whether the
statutory period for adverse possession applied or the
longer 20 year prescriptive rule. After much discussion,
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the 20 y~nr rule \VH~ applied. Then follo"·~ thi~ ~tntP
Inent on page ~~)3 ( 2t1 P. :2~);~) :
"It is eo needed that the usP and enjoy1nen t,
such as it 'vas, 'vas for lPss than :.?0 years, so that
period of limitation cannot apply."
Thi~ di~posed of that easP. Ineidentally and hy \Vn~·
of dicta, the eourt made the state1nent quoted on page
14 of the appellant's brief. But it \Ya~ Inade 'vith reference to a clain1 of a 10 .foot right of \Yay 'vhich 'vas perInanently occupied by a platform 'vhirh jutted out 3 or
4 feet into the passage,Ya)~ and the balance of the proposrd right of \Yay ".,.a.s customarily filled by a team that
\vas kept tied to the platform.
Reference is also made to the case of Jensen v.
Gerrard,. 85 Utah 481, 39 P.(2) 1070, which is likewise
unavailing as an authority for the case at bar. In that
ease, the alleged servient estate owner brought the suit
to restrain the defendant from using the ~roadway. It
·appeared that plaintiff's predecessor had required and
received rent repeatedly for the use of the roadway in
question and that such payments had been made within
the 20 year period. (The case was decided by the 'S·upreme Court in 1935, and the last cash payment ~as made
in 1916 and permission was sought and obtained for the
use of the road in the next year, 1917). Applying the
rule established in the Zollinger case, this use was
''under'' and not ''against'' the owner of the servient
estate and hence could not be the basis for a
tive right.

prescrip~
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I_Jet us here pause a Inoment to note that in the
case at bar, there was no permission ever sought or obtained (Tr. 117, 13'6, 149, 166 and 168). No one ever objected to their use. of the road (Tr. 136). No barriers
were ever erected (Tr. 136, 149, 166). The appellant
bank produced the manager of the Cache Valley Com. mission Company who was such from the time that corporation began its occupancy of the warehouse until it
7
"\\

as taken over by the respondent association. He was

in a position to state whether there was any writing
granting permission to his company. He could also
have testified to any parol agreement for the use of the
property. He did not do so. We can only surmise that
the use was without any permission.
The respondent next refers to the case of Bertolina
v. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P.(2) 346, wherein a para:graph is quoted with reference to the effect of the use
by others of the right of way and its effect upon those
claiming a right growing out of such use. We have no
quarrel with the doctrine that the use by third persons
of a right of way cannot, generally speaking, inure to
the use of the dominent estate tenant. But that rule is
subject to limitations which the Bertolina case did not
go into because they were not. involved in the facts of
that case.

10
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RinHT t)F O\Y.Xl 1~H. t)J:1_, 1)()~11Nb~Nrfl l1~~rr_i\rl'bJ
TO lL:\ \~r~ 'rHE \Y . -\ \T . -\ \'" .:\IL.:\BI~E FOB
BY 'l,HIR.D P:b} B~( )N~
\\~hile it is trnP~ n~ pointed out in the l~Prtolina en~P,
that the O\YJH?r of the don1inent P~tatP eannot gain a
right of \Yay by ~ho\Ying that third person~ had snrh a
right, there are cnst:•s \Yhere the use n1ade hy third persons does i_nure to the benefit of the O\Yner of thP d<nninent estate. The subject is headnoterl in 28 C.J.~. ~ee.
90, page 769, thusly:
''\\"'"hile a private \vay may not be used by the
general public, it may be used by the owner of the
\vay, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as
well as by persons transacting business with him,
in the ahsence: of a special agreement to the contrary.''
And the same authority follows up this headnote
with this language: ~, · .(:;:
"vVhile a private 'vay may not be used by the
public generally or b~~ any one having no better
right than the general public, the owner of such
a way i~ not limited to its use hy himself, but it
may be used by his family, by tenants occupying
the land \vith his authority, by his servants,
agents, or employees in conducting his business,
by persons transacting business with him, or by
guests for social purposes, except in cases where
the right of way is created by express agreement
and the user is restricted by the terms of the
agreement.''
A rather recent case involving this extent of user
l~SE

i~

that of Unverzagt v.

~.filler,

306 Mich. 260, 10 NW(2)
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849, where the defendant owned the fee of the streetf'
of a resort, subject to an easement for use by cottage
owners. The defendant sought to collect a license fee
from trades people attempting to deliver purchased articles to cottage owners. It was held that she eould not
do so.
851. ''This is not a question of the right
of outside merchants and tradesmen to use private streets; rather we consider it a question of
the right of the cottage owners to have the streets
used by those who are invited and requested by
cottage owners to make use of the streets for
plaintiff's benefit. Such merchants and tradesInen should be considered as invitees of the cottage owners ; and under the circumstances of this
case, we consider such use reasonably necessary
for the use and enjoyment of the easement.
"This does not mean that any and all invitees of a cottage owner may have the right to
use the streets. To so hold would mean that a
cottage owner might invite the use of the streets
by conventions, picnics, assemblies in general . . .
As thus limited, the use of the street by merchants
and tradesmen will not constitute an unlawful
increase of the burden on the servient estate.''
The rule was approved by the New Jersey court in
Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N.J.E. 170, 52 Atl. 234, where the
owner of the dominent estate operated a milk station
and used an alley for entrance and exit. The owner of
the alley attempted to bar Plaintiff's use except by foot.
The court held he could not do so, saying (62 Atl. 238):
''The way helongs to him as his property.
12
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. .-\11 person~ haYing occasion 111ny \vith his ( o':ner
of don1inent estate) pern1ission ·transact business
\vith him by passing to and fro over the vvay. ''
. The rule has application to all easements, not just
those created by grant. In Comn1onweath v. Buford,
2:2:-l Pa. 93, 73

_._~tl.

1064, the Pennsylvania court applied

the rule to a \vay of necessity. In that case the owners
of some coke ovens erected houses vvhich they rented to
"rorkmen. They also ovvned the fee to the streets and
did not dedicate them to the public. The Defendant in
this case vvas a tradesman who was arrested for trespass
\Vhile delivering over these private ways foods which had
been ordered. It \Vas held that he was not a trespasser
because a way of necessity would he acknowledged, and
such way included the right to use the streets by the
\

renter and his 'family
'' : .. and others who with permission of the
tenant visit his home for any lawful purpose."
It is a matter of the type of easement claimed. A
right of way for passage by vehicle would not

su~tain

the privileges to put an.irrigation ditch upon the same
property and convey water in it. And so in the case at
bar, it is not a matter of the hundreds of customers gaining a right of way or we gaining their privileges. Rathe;r
it is the type of easement claimed, which here is to have
a right of ingress and egress over the disputed right
of vvay for the officers and servants and customers of the
owner of the dominent esta.te.

13
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WIDTH OF THE RIGHT OF WAY
On page 17 of the brief, the bank questions the width
of the right of way found by the court. As noted supra
under the heading of Facts, the undisputed evidence was
that the way was wide enough for two trucks to pass
.( Tr. 158 and 159 bottom). These trucks had a maximu1n
\vidth of 8 feet (Tr. 159). The roadway was south of the
scalehouse (Tr. 159 top) which was 17 feet north of the
south line of the appellant's property (Tr. 195 top). The
south edge of the disputed right of way was just north
of appellant's south and our north line (Tr. 194 middle,

200 middle, 201). And it will be remembered that the
road was graveled ( Tr. 116, 133 171, 200, and 201), had a
I

solid bed to it (Tr. 171), and was hard surfaced (Tr. 142,
148). There was no evidence that the north 4 feet of our
property (that lying between the spur and appellant's
south property line) had any of those characteristics.
On page 18 of appellant's brief, an attempt is made
to distinguish this case from the Zollinger one on the
ground that in the latter the right of way was fenced.
While there is no particular magic in a fence, so far as
that case was concerned, in the case at bar there was an
effective barricade between the appellant bank's property and that of respondent, one which would have made
the use of the disputed right of way difficult if the railroad had left it that way. I refer to the spur track where
the rails projected above the surface of the ground. But
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the railroad proYided n ero~~ing ovPr thi~ barrier
placing planks so as to render it ea~ily passable.
OBI.AIGJ.~TIOX
~-\t

h)'

TO KEEP TRESPASSERS OUT

the top of· page 19 of appellant's brief and at

nunterous other plaef\s, appellant sets a "man of straw"
hy

~aying

that if a prescriptiYe right is thus gained, it

\Vould require a public serYice corporation to hire policeInen to keep trespassers off the property and WOUld require a util!ty to '·ride herd'' on all persons coming into
their freight yards. If appellant was right, it would
require similar action by every shopkeeper to eliminate
all but those '\vho are determined to buy in ·his store.
But there is no such requirement.
However, '\vhen the customers and officers and employees of an adjoining land owner flow over the land
of another to the extent of 50 to 100 per day (Tr. 149),
until at times the traffic resembled that on Main Street
(Tr. 112), and practically everyone in Logan came and
went to the Cache Valley Commission Company property over this right of way (Tr. 148), and that flow of
traffic was not secretive or unseen but consisted of
farmers' teams and wagons and trucks and cars, then
the owners whose land is being thus used cannot sit
by for twenty-five years and claim that he was required
by the nature of his business to permit it and that no
prescriptive right had been gained. One just can't sit
by and see that stream of traffic flo\ving to and from the
street and the point of crossing of the spur and let it go
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on for more than· twenty-five years and then attempt to
block up that roadway or crossing.
'The court and counsel will recall that in some places
in .L.os Angeles, the sidewalks are as broad ~s those in
Salt Lake, while in others they are narrow and terribly
congested. It will also be recalled that where the buildings are set back to give that broad way there is a brass
band which runs down inside line of the old sidewalk,
and in the space between the band and the buildings appears a plate imbedded in the concrete which notifies all
that the property inside the brass band is private propeTty and the license to use that private property iH
revocable at any time.
Frequently we see signs over or at the side of alleyways that the property is private, and the owner can
forbid the use of the way to any or all. This was not
done.·
This public utility had retained attorneys who were
leading members of the bar. Those attorneys and the
officers and servants ·of this railroad knew the

dangen~

which result from the long continued use of a right of
way much better than the board of directors of the Cache
Valley Commission Company.

The officers and em-

pibyees of that public· utility knew about rights of way.
Their ro'ad bed and spurs were constructed on property,
niucb. of which was held only under an easement. They
'

'

were' dealing in· easements constantly.

They handled

hundreds of rights of way. .They knew of this danger to
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their property, thi~ pre~rriptiYP right of \Vay, \Vhich
'vas building up. They took no stt>ps to prevent it either
~hort of the t'v~n ty years or in thP y~ars \Vhich followed
or eYer or at all. It is only \\~hen a local buyer, aequa.inted \vith this long continued use, purchased the
land and his heirs desire to g·et more than their donor
paid for that \Ye have thi~ road\vay blork0d for the first
ti1ne in about thirty years.
Ho,veYer, before leaving this plPa about being required to keep the freight yard open and hence unable
to keep out these 50 to 100 teams a day from the Cache
\ . . alley Commission Company, let us point out that this
fancied obligation_ of the carrier to the public could not
possibly include opening private entrances into the
freight yard, nor the placing of heavy planking to enable
all this traffic to flow in and out of the disputed highway adjacent to the spur. And the railroad, without
·hiring policemen or closing their freight yard to the public, could have choked off this growing right by the
simple expedient of putting up a fence along their p.roperty line between the main building and the warehouse.
But instead, it installed heavy plank crossings to facilitate the use of its road.
On page 20 of the appellant's brief, it is urged that
it would be incompatible with its duty to serve the
public, if the interurban had not permitted the public
free access. But no cases are cited to show that railroad
1nust open its property to the public so they may come
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on it at any place. Railroads have the same rights as
others, to fence their property and keep the public off
of it and to set up entrances where the public can be
served and to require the public to enter at those entrances if they seek its services.
In the middle of page 20 of its brief, appellant says
that if this right of way is granted, it will a1nount to taking property without due process. It is sufficient answer
to that to say that if imposing this burden is taking
the property without due process, the same objection
could be raised to all prescriptive easements. In view
of the fact that no citations are offered or argument
made, it may be safe to assert that this claim was thrown
in for rhetorical effect only.
Before leaving this portion of the case, it might be
well to exan1ine an assumption that the 50 to 100 vehiclrs
that passed over the disputed right of way in going to
and :from the Cache Valley property could not be dis·. tinguished from the heavy traffic flowing in and out of
. this railroad freight yard. As pointed out under the
. heading of "Facts," this railroad was no great artery
of .commerce. It was a poor,. sick, little interurban, passing from mortgage to mortgage and from receiver to
~receiver

and from sale to sale. Three times in its brief

·.span of thirty years (which exactly paralleled the use
of right of way here) it completed the cycle of mortgage,
receivership and sale. The last time, the owne·rs wer·e
apparently convinced that the traffic wasn't there to

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ustain

the business and the ~ale \Vas not of the railroad
in its entirety but by parcels. If the business was that
bad, and, if the business furnished the interurban by the
o\vner of the serYient estate w·as as great as the testimony
show·s (38 ears of apples one time, Tr. 215; other cars of
apples, Tr. 220: other cars of seed, Tr. 215; and was considered one of the interurban's "good eustomers ". (Tr.
216), it would appear that this 50 to 100 vehicles a day
passing over the dispu!ed right of \vay to and from the
Cache \'alley Commission Company (Tr. 149), this traffic like that on Main Street (Tr. 112), must have been conspicuous in th solitude of the freight yard.
NO WAY OF NECESSITY CLAIMED
On page 21 and elsewhere it is hinted that we are
grounding our right of way on the necessity of ·such a
road. This is not our contention. We have a passage
along the north side of our prop:erty where the spur was,
and we seek to use that space for the same purpose for
\Vhich the spur area was used, namely, to load and unload
large shipments through the north doorways. Since the
disputed right of· way has been blocked off, our traffic
has used that portion of our land formerly occupied by
the spur, as a passageway in lieu of the right of way
used for the preceding 30 years. And when big semitrailers are being loaded and unloaded at the north. doors,
it is necessary to divert the traffic from even this temporary passageway. But we claim no way of necessitv.
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We claim a right of way which accrued during 30 years
o'f open, continuous, notorious use which was taken without seeking or obtaining the permission of the interurban.
The case of Savage v. Nielsen, ____ Utah --------, 197
P.(2) 117, is cited to the effect that all.use of a right of
way is not adverse. But the facts there distinguish that
case from the one at bar. The predecessor of the owner
of the dominent' estate testified that he used the road by
permission ( 197 P. (2) 123) and he so continued until
1936. But in our case neither the previous owner of the
dominent estate nor.. its manager testified that permission was ever sought or granted to use the disputed
right .of way.
On page 23, ·this thought of permission is ·dwelt on
further, and it is stated that the companies were working
together in a friendly fashion. Butis a permit to use the
roadway, as· distinguished from use without. a peTmit,
thus leading to a prescriptive right, the only deduction
which ean be made of such

friendship~

It probably

seemed immaterial to the sick, little interurban whether
its big customer gained a pTesctiptive right or not. Such
a right of way would not interefer with the meager traf.fic into its near empty freighthouse. It would build up
this shipper and that in turn would result in more service, for this traffic-starved line.
~othing

Certainly there is

abortive about the deduction that this carrier
20
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\Ya~

content to let its neighbor and big etu;toHlPr gain a
prescriptiYe right. This "?as the finding of the e.ourt.
And let it not be lost sight of, that this is a law ra~e,
and such finding is binding· on the appellate eourt. This
rule of la "T "ill be diseussed further later on.

IXTERRUPTIOX OF USE OF \VAY FOR
C(1K\~~~~IENCE OF 0\VNER OF
DOniiNENT EST_A_TE
Reference

i~

made in the bank's brief on the botton1

of page 23 to the fact that the use of the right of 'vay
\Yas interrupted by the spotting of cars on the spur at

crossings A and B. It will be noted that the railroad
never placed a barrier on its land to prevent this flow
of traffic, but the obstruction referred to by appellant
\Vas placed on the land of respondent's predecessor. The
spur was on the Cache \Talley Commission Company's
land (plaintiff's Exhibit I, defendant's Exhibit 3). Also
that the obstruction (the spotted cars) was placed there
for the convenience of the Commission Company to load
its cars and was not the assertion of a right on the part
of the railroad that it could cut off use of the right of
way (Tr. 220). Furthermore the interruption was for
but 3 or 4 days and only in some years (Tr. 219, 220).
Rut our right is not dependent on a use every day.
"In order to create a right by prescription,
the user must be continuous for the statutory
period but this requirement does not involve any
necessity that the right be exercised constantly
for the statutory period but rather that there be

'
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no abandonment of the use or interruption thereof
by the owner of the land.'' 1 Thompson on Real
Property (Perm. Ed.) 724, Sec. 439.
REFUSAL OF EVIDENCE ON
CROSS EXAMINATION
The court sustained our ojection to the question:
''And so far as you know, when you used it and other
people used it, it was with the permission of the Railroad
Company to, facilitate their freight business.''
Supposing that the answer had been "yes", what
would it have added to the case~ It wouldn't have proved
that the use was permissive. It would merely have shown
that so far as this witness knew, the use was permissive
while the fact might he that the u~e was or was not
permissive.
On the othe-r hand, if the answer had been ''no'',
what would have been added to the testimony in the
case~

None of these three witnesses were submitted for

the purpose of testifying as to the consent or the lack of
consent of the railroad. Two of them were minor employees of the Cache Valley Commission Company, and
the other was merely a customer. The testimony of any
arrangements with the Railroad for permiss;ion rested
in the hands of appellant's witness, the manager of the
Cache Valley Commission Company, who did not testify
to any permission sought, granted or refused. No one
ever asked permission (Tr. 117, 136, 149, 166 and 168).
No one ever objected to their use of the road (Tr. 136).
22
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Xor \Vere any barrieadPs PYPr erected ( Tr.
It ''?as used as a Ina ttPr of right ( Tr.

1:~(),

14-D, 166). ·

14~)).

SeYeral rases are citerl \Vhere the trial eourt rP t'u~Pd
to per1nit eross-exainination into a

~tate

of n1ind or

authority of an actor to perform the act. But that was
not the question here. The question was not as to vvhether
these \vitnesses, in going on the disputed right of \Vay,
did so \v·ith adYerse intent but as to whether the witnesses thought or knew his travel was \vith the permission of the railroad. It might have been

materi~l

if

the question had been whether they knevv of any permission granted, but that wasn't the question. Furthermore,
whether they did or did not have an intent to gain an
·adverse right in going on the disputed right of way would
have no bearing on the ease. A right of way in them is
not claimed. The right sought here is for the owner of
the dominent estate to have access for his customers
whether they had friendly or hard feelings agamst the
owner of the servient estate. The questions objected to
\vere immaterial and called for

conclu~ions

and not facts.

If the questions had been whether the witness knew
of a permit from the railroad for such passage, there
would be no objection. But the witness's deduction that
the passage was with or without the railroad's permission is immaterial, ealls

f~r

speculation and the exclu-

Rion of it would hP- ha.rmlesR error.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP AS E\TIDENCE OF
US.E "UNDER'' AND NOT "AGAINST" OWNER
On page 23 it is urged that the friendly feeling of
cooperation between the utility on the one hand, and the
customer on the other, took this case out of the rule because the use, as appellant urges, was permissive. But
merely because the use was with the permission of the
owner, it does not follow that the use of the right of
way wa.s "under" the owner of the servient estate and
not ''against'' him. 'For instance, in the case of Holm
v. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 Pac. 403, there was a friendly
relationship existing between the owner of the land and
the company which operated a mill below his land. The
former pe-rmitted the latter to build- the mill race on
the farm in question. No written document was known
to have granted that right. Obviously the use must have
been with the permission of the owner. But still, was the
use "under" or "against" the

owner~

It was held to be

"against" the owner. So the fact that it was permissive
does not control but the question of whether the use was
"under" or" against" the o-vvner. In this case the court,
sitting without a jury, found the us·e to be against the
railroad.
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IF
THERE IS ·SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SUPORT IT
This is a law case in spite of the injunctive relief
sought. This was established in the case of Norhack v.
24
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Board of DirPrtors, 8± Utah fl06, 37 P.(2) 339 at 344,
"There the court

~aid:

· ~ ThP pri~na r~T purpose of the instant case
is the establislnnent of an easeinent" (for a right
of W'ay) ~ ~ ba~Pd upon an alleged prescriptive user.
If Plain tiff fails in this, his cause of action fails.
The right of injunction relief cannot come into
existence until the easement has been established.
This issue thP Plaintiff 'vas entitled to have tried
to a jur~T· ''
And at page 34-5 :
"A suit to establish an easement is legal.
~Iason v. Ross, 77 N JE 527, 77 Atl 44. ''
And again in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.(2)
1070, "\vhere the suit

wa~

to restrain the use of a roadway,

the court said :
"This being a law case (Nor back· v. Board
of Directors, etc. (Utah) 37 P(2) 339), this court
is not permitted under the Constitution or the
statutes to weigh the evidence. If there- is any
substantial competent evidence in the record to
support the court's findings or the verdict of the
jury, the judgment "rill not he disturbed ·in the
absence of some error of la"\v prejudicial to appellant. Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307,231 P 112·;
Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475, 290 P
7fl9.''
Then,
''As this is a law action, the question is not
whether the evidence would have supported the
decision in favor of appellants, hut whether the
decision made by the trial court finds support
in the evidence. If there is competent credible
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evidence to support the findings made by the trial
court, then those findings should stand.''
In the case at bar, the court found:
"5. That for more than 25 years preceding
the commencement of this action, said Utah Poultry & Farmers ·Cooperative and its predecessors
in interest in the land described in the next preceding paragraph have openly, notoriously, adversely and continuously and without interruptions and with the knowledg-e of the owner of the
property hereinafter describeq, used the following described servient estate as a roadway for
providing access for foot, vehicular and animal
traffic for themselves and for their servants,
customers and patrons in moving to and from
the above described dominant estate referred to
in paragraph No. 4; said servient estate is more
particularly described as follows:
'Commencing at a point 177 feet North of
the Southeast corner of Block 5, Plat "D", Logan
City :Survey, and running thence North 16%
feet; thence West 175 feet; thence South 16Ih
feet; thence East 175 feet to the place of beginning.'
That said use by the defendant and its predecessors in interest was not permissive.'' (Paragraph 5, Tr. 69).
The evidel).ce is undisputed that the respondent's
predecessor used the right of way for more than 25 years
without ever seeking or gaining the owne-r's permission
(Tr. 117, 136-, 149, 150, 166, and 168). The C-ache Valley
Commission Company used the road to the extent of 50
to 100 vehicles a day for the entire period. It was never
26
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denied the right to use the road until the property passed
from the hands of the railroad to a purchaser who was
a resident of Logan and must have known of the long
continued use "·hen he bought the property for the evidence showed that everyone in Logan used it (Tr. 148).
Ko\v that he has died, the appellant bank has sought to
terminate our use of over 25 years.
But as pointed out above, this is a la\v case, and
there is ample evidence to sustain the decision of the
lower court. The judgment should therefore be affirmed.

IRWIN CLAWSO·N
Attorney for Respo,ndent
arnd Defendatnt
Utah Poultry & Farme~rs Cooperative
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